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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court unwittingly spawned the so-called “Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine” in 1956 with its two same-day decisions in United Gas Pipe 
Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.1 and Federal Power Commission 
v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.2 The doctrine creates an important 
restriction on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC)3 
ability to interfere with wholesale energy rates set forth in private 
contracts.  It does this by triggering a heightened standard of review that 
applies when the Commission reviews fixed rates in private contracts; 
specifically, the doctrine shifts the standard from the default “just and 
reasonable” standard to a more rigorous “public interest” version.  This 
special modification attempts to balance the parties’ freedom of contract 
with the Commission’s statutory obligation to ensure just and reasonable 
rates for consumers.  For over 50 years, the doctrine has been a bedrock 
principle of private contract rights in the energy industry.  But two 
recent interpretations of the doctrine by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court are likely to significantly 
impact its scope in the future. 
In the summer of 2008, in Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. 
Public Utility District Number 1,4 the Supreme Court addressed the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine for the first time since its decisions in the two 
cases from whence the doctrine sprang over 50 years ago.  In addition to 
officially enshrining the doctrine in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, 
it interpreted its applicability in a way that may have expanded its reach 
beyond what was previously acknowledged.  Morgan Stanley held that 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies before and regardless of whether 
FERC conducts a plenary review of a contract rate and despite the 
presence of abnormal market conditions, thus fixing the doctrine’s 
trigger point at the time of contract formation.5  Just shy of three months 
earlier, in Maine Public Utilities Commission v. FERC, 6 the D.C. Circuit 
confronted the novel question of whether the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
applied to challenges brought by third parties not privy to the contract.  
 1. 350 U.S. 332 (1956). 
 2. 350 U.S. 348 (1956). 
 3. This Article uses the terms Commission and FERC interchangeably to refer to 
the agency and all of its post-Federal Power Act embodiments. 
 4. 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley].  Although the Court 
acknowledged that it has “seemingly blessed” certain tenets of the doctrine, id. at 2739-
40, it also confirmed that it has never utilized the language “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” in 
its opinions prior to this decision, id. at 2749 n.6. 
 5. Id. at 2746-48. 
 6. 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 
(D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009). 
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It held that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine did not apply to such non-parties 
and could not be used to subject them to a more demanding burden of 
proof as it does the contract principals because the contract cannot serve 
to bind non-parties.7 
These two interpretations about the doctrine’s scope may conflict.  
While some contend that the Supreme Court’s holding effectively 
overrules the Maine case, others maintain that the two cases are 
distinguishable because of the different types of contracts each case 
involved; the contract in Maine involved a multi-party settlement 
agreement while the contract in Morgan Stanley was a standard supply 
agreement.8  Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit itself denied FERC’s petition 
for rehearing in light of Morgan Stanley on this point; however, it did 
not explain why.9 
Accordingly, the basic question presented here is whether a non-party 
challenge to a contract rate is still exempt from the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine under Maine after the Morgan Stanley decision.  The answer 
may have serious ramifications for a range of potential litigants, 
including fledgling energy outfits trying to make inroads into the 
competitive and monopolistic markets of this industry, state ratemaking 
authorities that might find their last vestiges of regulatory power over 
 7. Id. at 478. 
 8.  Compare Richard P. Bress et al., A Deal Is Still a Deal: Morgan Stanley Capital 
Group v. Public Utility District No. 1, 2007-2008 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 308 (2009) 
(arguing that Morgan Stanley “requires use of the public interest standard for third-party 
challenges”) and Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Termination of 
Rulemaking Proceeding, 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,310 (2008) (repealing rulemaking to set a 
default standard of review in all jurisdictional agreements, considering the matter settled 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley ) with Petition of Respondent FERC 
for Panel Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n 
v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 06-1403) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 2008 
U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009), and 
Nev. Power Co., 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,312, para. 28 n.63 (2008) (responding to the Nevada 
Attorney General’s argument that challenges brought by Nevada Consumer Protection 
Department are not subject to Mobile-Sierra presumption as too premature to address). 
Some of the debate centers on whether the Maine and Morgan Stanley holdings apply 
separately to the different “types” of agreements that were present in those cases—specifically, 
that Maine applies to settlement agreements and that Morgan Stanley applies to wholesale 
power agreements.  See, e.g., Coral Power, L.L.C., 125 F.E.R.C.  ¶  61,176 (2008) 
(Wellinghoff, Comm’r and Kelly, Comm’r, concurring in part) (distinguishing 
Maine and Morgan Stanley  along the lines of the types of agreements involved therein). 
 9. See Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. 
FERC, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 06-1403) (per curiam). 
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interstate deliveries conclusively preempted, and consumer groups that 
advocate on behalf of the paying masses for fair and equitable rates. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief background of the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine, explaining its basic tenets, its effect on the standard of review 
in Commission proceedings, how it comes to be triggered, and how it 
applies.  Part III sets forth the interpretations provided by Morgan 
Stanley and Maine and explains the ramifications these holdings may 
have on non-party challenges to contract rates.  Part IV analyzes the 
significance of the Supreme Court’s characterization of the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine as representing a “presumption” about the contract rate.  
The Article concludes by speculating about the effects of Morgan 
Stanley and Maine decisions on the doctrine’s application going forward.  
It also lays out a policy argument favoring non-party exemption from the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine.  The addendum provides a brief discussion of 
the current appeal of the Maine case to the Supreme Court, the 
arguments of the parties therein, and an explanation of why this Article’s 
arguments are unique. 
II.  THE MOBILE-SIERRA DOCTRINE 
A.  Origins and Purpose10 
Wholesale energy rates are typically set in one of two ways.  The 
supplier can either set rates unilaterally by selling energy based on 
predetermined tariffs or can set rates bilaterally by contracting with 
individual buyers and fixing the rate in the terms of their agreement.11  
The Federal Power Act (FPA) charges FERC with ensuring that all rates 
are fair and reasonable and provides FERC with the power pursuant to 
this duty to review and approve tariff rates before they go into effect and 
to override privately negotiated rates at any time.12  Regulated utilities 
are required to file all eligible rate schedules, as well as any documents 
affecting those rates, with the Commission.13  Any rate that is found not 
 10. This synopsis of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is only intended as a brief overview of 
the doctrine’s basic tenets.  For a more complete discussion of the origins, cases, and 
evolution of the doctrine, see generally Carmen L. Gentile, The Mobile-Sierra Rule: It’s 
Illustrious Past and Uncertain Future, 21 ENERGY L.J. 353 (2000). 
 11. See Morgan Stanley , 128 S. Ct 2733, 2737-38 (2008). 
 12. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-e (2006).  See also Boston Edison Co. 
v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In regulating electricity rates, the [FPA] 
follows . . . a well-developed model: the utility sets the rates in the first instance, subject 
to a basic statutory obligation that rates be just and reasonable . . . .  [FERC] can 
investigate newly filed rate, or an existing rate, and, if the rate is inconsistent with the 
statutory standard, order a change in the rate to make it conform to that standard.”). 
 13. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c).  Under § 824d, regulated utilities are required to keep on 
file with the Commission “schedules showing all rates and charges for any transmission 
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be “just and reasonable,” grants “undue preference or advantage,” or 
creates “undue prejudice or disadvantage” is unlawful and must be 
corrected.14  The Commission, acting sua sponte or upon complaint, is 
authorized to temporarily suspend any new rates, pending hearings to 
evaluate whether they meet these criteria.15  If any rate fails review—i.e., 
it is found to be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or 
preferential”—the Commission can replace it with a rate that it 
determines will satisfy the criteria—i.e., one that is “just and 
reasonable.”16  Taken together, this establishes the framework of just-
and-reasonable review––the standard that the Commission must apply 
when considering challenges brought against filed rates under sections 
205 and 206 of the FPA.17  This framework and obligation operates at all 
times over the background policy at the heart of the FPA: consumer 
protection.18 
The Mobile-Sierra doctrine limits FERC’s power to adjust rates in the 
context of rates fixed by a contract, as opposed to rates fixed by the 
Commission in the traditional tariff manner based on a fair rate of 
return.19  As previously mentioned, the doctrine is the genesis of two 
Supreme Court cases decided on the same day in 1956—Mobile and 
Sierra—and derives its name from the Circuit Courts’ shorthand 
reference to the rule that the two decisions created.20 
In Mobile, the Court explained that the Commission’s review power 
exists to ensure the lawfulness of rates fixed by a company, rather than 
or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . together with all contracts which 
in any manner affect or relate to such rates [and] charges.”  Id.  The FPA gives FERC 
jurisdiction to regulate wholesale energy rates except the rates charged by local utilities 
to their customers.  Id. §§ 824(a), (b)(1). 
 14. Id. §§ 824d(a)-(b), (e). 
 15. Id. § 824d(e). 
 16. Id. § 824e(a) (“Whenever the Commission . . . upon its own motion or upon 
complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification . . . or that any rule, regulation, 
practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, 
or unduly discriminatory or preferential . . . [it] shall determine the just and reasonable 
rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed 
and in force, and shall fix the same by order.”). 
 17. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 306 F.3d 1112, 1118 (D.C. Cir 2002); Boston, 
233 F.3d at 66. 
 18. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 
1058 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008) [hereinafter 
Snohomish]. 
 19. Boston, 233 F.3d at 65. 
 20. Snohomish, 471 F.3d at 1057 n.3; Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F.3d 
403, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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by the Commission.21  While the Act preserves companies’ powers to 
contract and set rates no differently than they would in absence of the 
Act, “the contracts remain fully subject to the paramount power of the 
Commission to modify them when necessary in the public interest.”22 
In Sierra, the Court expanded on this new public-interest standard 
articulated in Mobile.23  It explained that in order for a party to prevail 
on a unilateral request to increase a contract rate under this public-
interest standard, it must show that the rate is “so low as to adversely 
affect the public interest––as where it might impair the financial ability 
of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an 
excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.”24  As a result, a rate that 
yielded a less-than-fair rate of return––sufficient grounds for revision 
under the traditional rate-setting model––would no longer justify 
invocation of the Commission’s revisionary powers. 
In its most narrow sense, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine establishes the 
rule that a party’s unilateral request for a revision of a contract rate with 
another party may only proceed if the existing rate is such that it 
adversely affects the public interest.  This creates the so-called “public 
interest” standard of review that applies in proceedings of this type.  The 
public-interest standard permits a rate revision if the petitioning party 
can show that the existing rate: (1) impairs the financial ability of the 
public utility to continue its service, (2) casts an excessive burden upon 
other consumers, or (3) is unduly discriminatory.25  The rule’s rationale 
is that a mutually agreed-upon rate should not be deemed “unjust” or 
“unreasonable” simply because it turns out to be unprofitable for one of 
the parties who agreed to it in the first place.26  The rule’s policy is to 
“preserve the integrity of contracts [and] permit[] the stability of supply 
arrangements . . . [that] is essential to the health of the . . . industry.”27  
Therefore, the doctrine both prevents a regulated party from (mis)using 
the Commission’s power in order to relieve itself of its own 
 21. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 341 
(1956).  In Mobile, the Court held that “[t]he scope and purpose of the Commission’s 
review power [is] to determine whether the rate fixed by the . . . company is lawful.”  Id.  
While the FPA preserves the power of companies to “make rates and contracts” no 
differently than if they would in absence of the FPA, “the contracts remain fully subject 
to the paramount power of the Commission to modify them when necessary in the public 
interest.”  Id. at 343-44. 
 22. Id. at 344. 
 23. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 354-55. 
 27. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 380. 
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“improvident bargain”28 and preserves the other party’s bargained-for 
benefit.29  For this reason, a petitioner has a heavy burden to overcome 
before the Commission will intervene to adjust a contractually set rate. 
In sum, the doctrine exists to prevent contract parties from 
manipulating the Commission’s power for their own ends and to restrain 
the Commission from exercising its own power unjustly.  It seeks to 
balance private contractual rights with the Commission’s regulatory 
mission to protect the consuming public by subordinating the statutory 
revision mechanism to the cannons of contract law.30  As such, the 
parties’ contract comes to govern the legality of the rate and defines the 
rights of buyer and seller, up to the point where the public interest 
demands otherwise. 
B.  The Just-and-Reasonable & Public-Interest Standards 
While at least one court has called the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
“refreshingly simple,”31 its application has actually been fraught with 
ambiguity over the years, particularly regarding the different meanings 
and requirements of the just-and-reasonable and public-interest 
standards.  As the First Circuit described in attempting to distinguish the 
standards, “Admittedly, the rates are too high for the period in question 
to be just and reasonable . . . but are they so high as to be contrary to the 
public interest—and what would this mean anyway?  Very little useful 
precedent exists . . . .”32  While the precise threshold dividing the two 
standards remains elusive, we can ascertain in at least broad strokes the 
major substantive difference between them. 
 28. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (noting that “the purpose of the power given to the 
Commission by § 206(a) is the protection of the public interest, as distinguished from the 
private interests of the utilities . . . “). 
 29. Town of Norwood v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1306, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 30. Ne. Utilities Serv. Co. v. FERC (Northeast II), 55 F.3d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]he Mobile-Sierra doctrine . . . represents the Supreme Court’s attempt to strike a 
balance between private contractual rights and the regulatory power to modify contracts 
when necessary to protect the public interest.”); Borough of Lansdale v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 494 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (explaining that the purpose of the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine is to “subordinate the [revision] mechanism to the broad and 
familiar dictates of contract law” and, thus, “[t]he contract between the parties 
governs the legality of the rate”). 
 31. Borough of Lansdale, 494 F.2d at 1113. 
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It is important to first realize that the public-interest standard of 
review created by Mobile and Sierra is technically no legally different 
from the statutory just-and-reasonable standard.33  While the term 
“public interest” does not appear anywhere in FERC’s authorizing 
statute, apparently having been conjured by the Supreme Court,34 and 
while the two standards are confusingly referred to as “the two modes of 
review,” the public-interest standard is really just a special application of 
the statutory just-and-reasonable standard that applies in the context of 
contract rates.35 The public-interest standard is ostensibly only a 
contextual tweak to the statutory standard of review for challenges of a 
particular nature, not an “obviously indefensible” modification of the 
statute itself.36  But while the two standards are theoretically one-and-
the-same, substantively, the special public-interest and plain just-and-
reasonable standards entail very different burdens of proof. 
Both standards leave considerable room for interpretation and involve 
fact-intensive inquiries.37  Both have been the subject of confusion and 
varying application.38  Without speculating on the specific facts that 
would be needed to prevail under each standard, it suffices to say that 
the public-interest standard poses a much higher burden of proof than 
the plain just-and-reasonable standard.39  In the past, the burden created 
by the public-interest standard has even been described as “practically 
insurmountable,” rendering the possibility of future rate modification 
“virtually meaningless.”40 As the Supreme Court explained, the 
 33. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2743 (2008) (agreeing with the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation on this point). 
 34. Boston, 233 F.3d at 65. 
 35. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. at 2740. 
 36. Id. at 2743. 
 37. See Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. at 2747, 2750 (agreeing with Ninth Circuit that 
the “three [Sierra] factors are in any event not the exclusive components of the public 
interest” in all contexts); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968) 
(“[A]dministrative authorities must be permitted . . . to adapt their rules and policies to the 
demands of changing circumstances.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Snohomish, 471 F.3d 1053, 1060 n.8, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting 
a “zone of reasonableness” test in a high-rate challenge); Transmission Access Policy 
Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 708-13 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming FERC’s 
adoption of specialized “generic public interest findings” in orders imposing open 
access); Northeast II, 55 F.3d 686, 690-91 (1st Cir. 1995) (adopting a broader definition 
of the public interest in high-rate challenge reflects “whose ox is gored”); Kansas Cities 
v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (recognizing that “many courts and regulatory 
agencies confuse the concepts of just and reasonable rates and nondiscriminatory rates”); 
see also, e.g., Boston, 233 F.3d at 64-65. 
 39. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Northeast II, 
55 F.3d at 691. 
 40. Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that the possibility of future rate change is virtually meaningless unless it 
envisions a just and reasonable standard); accord Kansas Cities, 723 F.2d at 87-88 (“To 
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regulatory system “contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in 
circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.”41  In this vein, the D.C. 
Circuit offered an illustrative juxtaposition: 
[In promulgating a rule,] FERC’s rulemaking authority requires only that it point to 
a generic public interest in favor of a proposed rule; the public interest necessary 
to override a private contract, however, is significantly more particularized and 
requires analysis of the manner in which the contract harms the public interest and of 
the extent to which abrogation or reformation mitigates the contract’s deleterious 
effect. 
    . . . [M]ore is required to justify regulatory intervention in a private contract 
than a simple reference to the policies served by a particular rule.42 
C.  Triggering the Rule 
As previously explained, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies to 
wholesale rates fixed by contract.  However, the contract parties still 
have control over whether and to what extent it will apply to their 
particular agreement.  According to the D.C. Circuit in Papago, contract 
parties can specify in their contract the standard of review that will 
govern subsequent review of any rates contained therein.43  Under 
Papago, parties have three options to choose from: the statutory just-
and-reasonable standard, the public-interest standard, or a hybrid 
arrangement that adopts the public-interest standard for the parties but 
preserves for the Commission the right to review under the just-and-
reasonable standard.44  Regardless of which approach the parties choose, 
the rate can always be challenged under the public-interest standard, 
since as the court explained: 
  
assume that a contractual provision pertaining to rate adjustment refers to [the public 
interest] standard is to assume that it was intended to be virtually inoperative . . . .”). 
 41. Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 822 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (citing 
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956)), quoted in 
Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct at 2748. 
 42. Texaco Inc. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1091, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 43. Papago, 723 F.2d at 953. 
 44. Id.  Under the first option, the parties must obtain a preliminary approval from 
the Commission that the rate is just and reasonable, after which subsequent revisions are 
also considered under the just and reasonable standard.  Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.    
§ 824d (2006).  The third method is also known as a “Memphis Clause,” named for the 
case that first explained its operation.  See generally United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 110-113 (1958). 
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The Commission’s obligation to insure that rates do not violate [the public interest] 
is imposed for the direct benefit of the public at large rather than (like the 
prescription of just and reasonable rates) for the direct benefit of the seller and 
purchaser; and it therefore cannot be waived or eliminated by agreement of the 
latter.45 
If the parties are remiss to specify an arrangement, the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine governs the rate by default.  As the First Circuit explained, it is 
the common understanding of those “bargaining in the shadow of the 
doctrine” that their contracts will be governed by the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine unless there is a specific arrangement otherwise.46  Therefore, it 
is reasonable to assume that, absent language to the contrary, “the 
specification of a rate or formula by itself implicates Mobile-Sierra.”47 
As this illustrates, the contract principals have far reaching ability to 
insulate their contract rate against future challenges, but this discretion is 
not without limits.  In Northeast I and Northeast II, the First Circuit 
examined how the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies to FERC when it 
intervenes sua sponte to adjust a contract rate.48  The underlying contract 
contained a provision that attempted to restrict any subsequent review to 
the public-interest standard, regardless of whether it was initiated by the 
contract parties or the Commission.49  The Commission refuted the 
provision’s applicability to the Commission itself, arguing that the 
principals could neither abrogate a third party’s right nor the 
Commission’s duty to review rates under the just-and-reasonable 
standard and that, even if they could, it could nonetheless use a more 
 45. Papago, 723 F.2d at 954. 
 46. Boston Edison Co., v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2000).  Drawing in part 
on Papago, the court stated, “In 1972, as today, the parties could negate the protection 
afforded by Mobile-Sierra by providing that a contract rate initially fixed by the parties 
and filed with FERC could be overridden by FERC at any time under the just and 
reasonable standard.”  Id. (citing Memphis Light, 358 U.S. at 112; Papago, 723 F.2d at 
953; Kansas Cities v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 47. Id. at 67 (citing Texaco Inc., 148 F.3d at 1096; Appalachian Power Co. v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n, 529 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) (emphasis added); accord 
Appalachian Power, 529 F.2d at 348. 
 48. See generally Northeast II, 55 F.3d 686 (1st Cir. 1995); Ne. Utilities Serv. Co. 
v. FERC (Northeast I), 993 F.2d 937 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 49. Ne. Utilities Serv. Co., 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,266, 61,838 (1990).  The condition 
provided that: 
Further, Seller [North Atlantic], Buyer [PSNH] and [the State of New Hampshire] 
shall not, and each hereby waives (to the extent it may lawfully do so) any 
right it may have to, file a complaint with respect to the rates charged under 
this Agreement pursuant to Section 206 of the Federal Power Act and the 
Rules and Regulations of the FERC promulgated thereunder without 
the prior written consent of each of the others, and each further agrees 
that in any proceeding by the FERC under Section 206 the FERC shall not 
change the rate charged under this Agreement unless such rate is found to be 
contrary to the public interest.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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flexible version of the public-interest standard than the “practically 
insurmountable” one described in Papago.50 
On appeal, the First Circuit gave mixed responses to these arguments.  
On one hand, in Northeast I, it disagreed with the Commission that the 
parties could not bind it to the public-interest standard of review, 
explaining that the Commission is obligated to “respect certain private 
contract rights in the exercise of its regulatory powers,” including the 
right to fix a more rigorous standard of review.51  Thus, Mobile-Sierra 
protects the right of the parties to stipulate which type of review they 
want—just-and-reasonable or the more demanding public-interest 
standard—by which the Commission must abide.52  On the other hand, 
in Northeast II, it mostly agreed with the Commission that even if the 
public-interest standard applied, it would be a more flexible version than 
the “practically insurmountable” one described in Papago.53  It affirmed 
that the Commission has discretion to determine what circumstances 
implicate the public interest and that the Sierra factors did not comprise 
an exhaustive list in that regard.54  The particular application of the 
public-interest standard and its focus of concern “all depends on whose 
ox is gored and how the public interest is affected.”55  To that end, the 
Commission has the most authority to read additional protections into 
the public-interest standard when it acts to protect third-party interests 
adversely affected by the contract terms.56 
III.  THE SHOWDOWN 
A.  The Morgan Stanley Interpretation 
In Morgan Stanley, the Supreme Court sought to clarify at which point 
in time the Mobile-Sierra doctrine begins to apply to a contract rate.  
Specifically, the court examined whether the doctrine applies prior to 
 50. Id. at paras. 61,838-39; Ne. Utilities Serv. Co, 66 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,332, 62,076 
(1994) (order on remand from Northeast I). 
 51. Northeast I, 993 F.2d. at 960.  The court did not address the non-party issue 
raised by FERC, id. at 961-62, possibly because the challenge was not brought by a true 
outside party but, rather, by FERC acting sua sponte, id. 
 52. Id. at 961. 
 53. Northeast II, 55 F.3d at 689; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text 
(discussing Sierra factors). 
 54. Id. at 689-90. 
 55. Id. at 691. 
 56. Id. (citing Northeast I, 993 F.2d at 961). 
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FERC reviewing a rate for the first time.57 The case involved a 
consolidated appeal of several FERC orders involving requests to 
modify rates set forth in contracts created during the Western Energy 
Crisis of 2000-2001.58  In the administrative hearings, FERC determined 
that under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the modifications were not 
warranted because the parties failed to meet the burden of proof 
demanded by the public-interest standard.59  The petitioners appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit, claiming that the Commission had incorrectly applied 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in considering their requests.60 
One of the petitioners’ central arguments, and the key issue presented 
to the Ninth Circuit, was that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine did not apply 
unless the Commission first had the opportunity for initial review prior 
to the rate going into effect.61  The Ninth Circuit agreed.  It reasoned that 
the application of Mobile-Sierra depended on “the regulatory context in 
which the contracts were initially formed” and whether it “provide[s] a 
sound basis to believe that the resulting rates are just and reasonable.”62  
Assuring that this basis exists requires both “timely and procedurally 
effective review of rates . . . and [] meaningful substantive standards for 
review of the circumstances of contract formation.”63  The first element 
cannot be satisfied unless the Commission has the initial “opportunity 
for plenary, ‘just and reasonable’ agency review.”64  The second element 
cannot be satisfied unless it can be shown that the contract negotiations 
 57. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. at 2737. 
 58. Snohomish, 471 F.3d at 1067.  The contracts at issue were for future supplies 
of energy from the wholesale energy market, which is regulated by FERC.  Id. at 1056-57. 
 59. See Nev. Power Co., 103 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61353, para. 111 (2003), reh’g denied, 
Nev. Power Co, 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61185 (2003). 
 60. Snohomish, 471 F.3d at 1056-57. 
 61. Id. at 1057. The rates in issue were subject to FERC’s market-based rate 
authorization.  Id. at 1061.  Under this mechanism, which is a result of the recent policy 
reforms to facilitate open access, a utility is authorized to charge whatever rate the 
market will bear, so long at the utility itself first meets certain structural and market-
power criteria. Id. at 1065.  This contrasts the cost-based rate mechanism whereby FERC 
approves a rate, should it choose to investigate it, that would allow the utility a fair rate 
of return while protecting ratepayers from exploitation.  Id. at 1063.  The key difference 
is how the rate is effectuated.  In the latter mechanism, a rate becomes effective only 
after it has been filed with FERC and approved.  Id. at 1060.  In the former mechanism, 
the rate is effective immediately, so long as the utility maintains its market-based rate 
authorization from FERC, which is subject to re-verification. Id. at 1060, 1065. 
 62. Id. at 1075. 
 63. Id. at 1075-76.  In the context of a market-based rate mechanism, see supra 
note 61, the court found that an initial market-based rate authorization could only qualify 
as sufficient prior review when “accompanied by effective oversight permitting timely 
reconsideration of [the] authorization if market conditions change.” Id. at 1080.  It 
concluded that FERC’s monitoring and compliance mechanism fell short in this regard, 
and, therefore, invoking the Mobile-Sierra doctrine had the effect of FERC “abdicat[ing] 
its statutory responsibility . . . .”  Id. at 1084. 
 64. Id. at 1077. 
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took place in a “functional marketplace;” otherwise, there can be no 
assurance that the rates are just and reasonable or that the policies 
underlying the Mobile-Sierra doctrine will be respected.65  The Ninth 
Circuit found that FERC had failed to examine either of these 
preconditions and remanded the case for reconsideration.66 
The Supreme Court rejected outright this interpretation of the 
doctrine, which it said had misportrayed the rule as a form of estoppel on 
the Commission.67  The Court explained that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
provides the exclusive test of “what it means for a rate to satisfy the just-
and-reasonable standard in the contract context . . . regardless of when 
the contract is reviewed.”68  The theory of the doctrine is “grounded in 
the commonsense notion that ‘[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging 
the rate and the party charged [are] often sophisticated businesses 
enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected 
to negotiate a “just and reasonable” rate as between the two of them.’”69  
And under it, “the ordinary mode for evaluating contractually set rates is 
to look to whether the rates seriously harm the public interest, not to 
whether they are unfair to one of the parties that voluntarily assented to 
the contract.”70  The Court also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit that 
application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine required a preliminary finding 
on underlying market conditions.71  It reasoned that to require so would 
create a “perverse rule” that would undermine contract reliability in 
volatile markets despite any public-interest issues and reduce incentives 
to contract during turbulent markets in the future.72  The Court noted, 
however, that the Commission could still set aside a contract, given 
evidence of misconduct at the formation stage, such as fraud, duress, bad 
faith, or other traditional affirmative defenses, or if there is evidence of 
illegal market manipulation by one of the parties, the existence of which 
would rebut the basis for the presumption about the contract rate.73 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1085, 1090. 
 67. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2737, 2746 (2008). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (quoting Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 476 (2002)) 
(alterations in original). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2746-47. 
 73. Id. at 2747. 
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B.  The Maine Exception 
In March 2008, the D.C. Circuit confronted the question of whether 
the Commission could approve a clause in a settlement agreement, 
stipulating that any subsequent challenges brought by non-contracting 
third parties must be reviewed under the “the highly-deferential ‘public 
interest’ standard.”74  The court answered this question in the negative.75 
The contract in question, “a comprehensive settlement agreement that 
had the effect of redesigning New England’s capacity market,”76 
contained a clause specifying that the public-interest standard would 
apply to all future requests to modify its terms regardless of who brought 
the proposal forward—a party, non-party, or FERC.77  In the first appeal 
to the D.C. Circuit, the Commission rejected the notion that it legally 
could be bound by the clause.78  However, it subsequently approved the 
 74. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 477 (2008) (per curiam), 
reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
2050 (2009). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 467.  In a capacity market “‘the [transmission provider] compensates the 
generator for the option of buying a specified quantity of power irrespective of whether it 
ultimate buys the electricity.”  Maine, 520 F.3d at 467 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).  
Transmission providers often use this as “spinning” power to deal with fluctuations in 
demand.  See id.  The problem was that the market was so poorly functioning that the 
“supply of capacity was barely sufficient to meet the region’s demand,” so the utilities 
were at risk of violating reliability criteria.  Id. (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. 
¶ 61,340, para. 63 (2006)).  To address this problem, demand–supply generators sought 
to enter into “‘Reliability Must-Run’ agreements” with the New England Independent 
System Operator (ISO) in order to recover their full cost of service and remain in 
operation despite their financial challenges.  Id. at 467-68.  However, these types of 
contracts have the effect of hindering entrance and competition in the market.  See id. at 
468 (quoting Devon Power LLC, 103 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,082, para. 29 (2003)).  In an attempt 
to deal with this problem, FERC approved a limited version of the generators’ initial 
proposal and directed the ISO to “develop a new market mechanism” that would ensure 
that “prices would be highest in the regions with the most severe capacity shortages, 
which would encourage new entry.”  Id. (citing Devon Power LLC, 103 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,082, paras. 31-32 (2003)).  In response, the ISO introduced a “demand 
curve” that was used to set pricing, which proved to be highly controversial.  Id. (citing 
Devon Power LLC, 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,240, paras. 10, 38, 53 (2004)).  After months of 
negotiations, a settlement was reached, the key feature of which was the creation of the 
Forward Capacity Market, which eliminated need for a demand curve.  Id. at 469 (citing 
Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, paras. 15-16 (2006)).  However, eight parties 
opposed the settlement.  Id. (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, para. 15 
(2006)).  The settlement also set up a “transition payments” system to facilitate the 
Forward Market through a series of fixed payments to be paid to the generators during 
the transition period—a feature that was highly contentious.  Id. (Devon Power LLC, 115 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, paras. 30-31 (2006)). 
 77. Id. (quoting Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, para. 172 (2006)). 
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clause, reasoning that the “use of the more deferential [public-interest] 
standard in a limited number of circumstances would promote ‘rate 
stability.’”79  The petitioners, various entities that were not parties to the 
settlement, disputed the provision arguing that it would deprive them of 
their statutory right to challenge rates under the just-and-reasonable 
standard.80  The Court of Appeals agreed with this argument, holding 
that the non-parties could not be held to a provision in a contract to 
which they were not parties and that their challenge could not thereby be 
subjected to the public-interest standard of review.81  It explained that 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is only meant to guarantee stability “as 
between the contracting parties.”82  It does not apply to non-contracting 
party challenges since that would abrogate FERC’s statutory duty to 
review such challenges under the just-and-reasonable standard.83  Thus, 
it held that the Commission’s acceptance of the clause imposing a 
stricter standard was unlawful.84  The court explained: 
The Mobile-Sierra doctrine carves out an exception to [the just-and-reasonable 
standard] based on the “familiar dictates of contract law.”  When two or more 
parties reach a negotiated settlement over a disputed rate, FERC applies a strong 
presumption that the settled rate is just and reasonable, and the Commission 
may only set aside the contract for the most compelling reasons.  The purpose of 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is to “preserve the benefits of the parties’ bargain as 
reflected in the contract, assuming that there was no reason to question what 
transpired at the contract formation stage.” 
    Courts have rarely mentioned the Mobile-Sierra doctrine without reiterating 
that it is premised on the existence of a voluntary contract between the parties . . . .  
Similarly this Court has emphasized that the deferential public-interest standard 
only applies to “freely negotiated private contracts that set firm rates or establish a 
specific methodology for setting the rates for service.”85 
From this, the court went on to hold that “Mobile-Sierra is invoked 
when ‘one party to a rate contract on file with FERC attempts to effect a 
unilateral rate change by asking FERC to relieve its obligations under a 
 79. Maine, 520 F.3d at 470 (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, 
paras. 183-86 (2006)). 
 80. See id. at 467. 
 81. See id. at 478. 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 470. 
 85. Id. at 477 (citations omitted). 
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contract whose terms are no longer favorable to that party.’”86  The 
Commission disputed this conclusion, reiterating that the public-interest 
standard would only be applied to a “narrow category” of challenges,87 
and that furthermore, it still leaves the Commission with “significant 
authority to protect non-parties to the settlement from harm” and 
adequately safeguard third-party interests.88  The court rejected both of 
these arguments because, in its view, adoption of either would still result 
in “ depriv[ing]” or “derogat[ing]” the non-settling parties’ statutory 
right to a just-and-reasonable standard of review.89  In conclusion, the 
court summarized: 
[T]he Mobile-Sierra doctrine is designed to ensure contract stability as between 
the contracting parties—i.e., to make it more difficult for either party to shirk its 
contractual obligations.  It makes no sense to say that the values of “stability” 
and “certainty” are furthered by applying the deferential standard of review to 
the eight parties that refused to agree to the terms of the settlement.90 
C.  The Conflict 
The conflict between Morgan Stanley and Maine may not be readily 
apparent unless one appreciates the dimensions of the questions resolved 
by the opinions.  In Morgan Stanley, the Court dealt with the timing and 
triggering of the Mobile-Sierra rule.91  The Court determined that the 
rule applied at the time of contract formation and regardless of 
preliminary agency review because the doctrine stands for the 
“presumption” that rates established by sophisticated parties who 
bargain at arm’s length are per se just and reasonable.92  Thus, the 
only substantive prerequisite to applying the rule is that the contract 
was formed through arm’s-length bargaining absent circumstances that 
would lead one to doubt the fairness of the agreement at the outset.93  
This holding raises an important question, which is at the heart of this 
Article, that implicates the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Maine: namely, 
since Morgan Stanley held that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies from 
the time of contract formation, does a non-party then automatically lose 
the “statutory right” recognized in Maine to challenge the rates under the 
 86. Id. at 478 (quoting Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 280, 284 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)).  The court also noted, “It goes without saying that a contract cannot 
bind a nonparty.”  Id. (quoting EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 478 n.9 (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, para. 184 
(2006). 
 89. Id. at 478 & n.9. 
 90. Id. at 479 (citation omitted). 
 91. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2737 (2008). 
 92. Id. at 2745-46. 
 93. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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just-and-reasonable standard by virtue of the contract’s existence?  
Answering this question requires further inquiry into the contours of the 
Court’s “presumption” language, the substantive effect that a presumption 
would have on a non-party’s challenge, and whether a far-reaching 
presumption can be squared with the goals of the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine.94 
IV.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRESUMPTION CHARACTERIZATION 
Throughout the Morgan Stanley opinon, the Supreme Court refers to 
the doctrine as the “Mobile-Sierra presumption,” insofar as it creates a 
legal presumption about the rate in the underlying contract.95  Prior to 
the D.C. Circuit’s reference in Union Electric Co. v. FERC to Mobile-
Sierra, the doctrine was never directly tied to the word “presumption” in 
this way.96  Interestingly, it was not so referenced again until the Ninth 
Circuit’s usage in the cases leading up to the Morgan Stanley appeal.97  
Before these appearances, the Courts of Appeal commonly referred to 
doctrine as triggering a “standard of review.”98  The Commission also 
seemed to understand it as such.99  The ultimate question regarding the 
change in terminology is whether it makes a substantive difference.  
Does rebutting a presumption require something different than satisfying 
a standard of review, and how might this affect non-party challenges? 
 94. A common reaction, shared by at least two FERC Commissioners, is that the 
cases are distinguishable in terms of what “types” of contract they each are applicable to.  
See supra note 8.  While this is a plausible reconciliation of the two cases, it is by no 
means conclusive.  The D.C. Circuit never implied that it meant for its holding in Maine 
to be limited only to cases involving settlement agreements, utilized broad language in 
its reasoning, and interpreted the same fundamental principles as the Supreme Court did 
in coming to its conclusion in Morgan Stanley.  Considering this, it is at least as 
plausible that the D.C. Circuit did not intend its opinion to be limited along “type-of-
contract” lines.  Furthermore, if it would be unfair to hold parties that were involved in 
the contract negotiations to the public-interest standard, how would it then be fair to 
apply the standard to parties who were not involved at all, but may also be affected by 
the contract’s terms?  Such a proposition would be difficult to construct. 
 95. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley , 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2735 (2008). 
 96. 890 F.2d 1193, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 97. See Snohomish, 471 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006); Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. 
FERC, 474 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 98. See, e.g., Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 470, 478 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 
129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009); Wisc. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d 239, 254 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F.3d 403, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Northeast II, 55 F.3d 686, 692 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 99. See, e.g., Ne. Utilities Serv. Co., 66 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,332, 62076 (1994). 
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Although perhaps one of the most slippery legal terms of art, 
presumptions are most simply characterized as assumptions about the 
meaning of a certain basic fact that allow or require the fact-finder to 
reach a certain pre-ordained conclusion when that triggering fact is 
present.100  They serve as an evidentiary short cut, substituting for proof 
of certain intermediary details that would otherwise be required in order 
to establish the inference sought.  A standard of review embodies 
assumptions about the level of deference that should be given in 
evaluating the outcome of a prior adjudicative process and also defines 
the scope of relevant materials that may be examined during the 
inquiry.101  With questions of fact, a presumption seeks to establish 
criteria for evaluating the validity of the fact-finder’s conclusion based 
on the facts she had available to consider. 
The important difference between these two devices is the methods 
and means required to prevail under each of them.  To overcome a 
presumption, one must effectively challenge the validity of the 
presumptive fact itself, not the basic fact upon which it is premised.102  
In the present circumstance, the basic fact is that the parties had a 
contract, and the presumptive fact, or conclusion drawn, is that the rate 
is just and reasonable.  Thus, it follows from the very creation of the 
contract itself that the rate therein is presumed just and reasonable.  
According to the Supreme Court, in order to attack the presumptive fact, 
one must show that the rate is not just and reasonable by either 
demonstrating the existence of a contract defense or absence of arm’s-
length bargaining.103  If such infirmities exist at the contract formation 
 100. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 495-96 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 
2006). 
 101. See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW § 1.01 (3d ed. 1999).  Strictly speaking, a standard of review is “[t]he criterion 
by which an appellate court exercising appellate jurisdiction measures the constitutionality of 
a statute or the propriety of an order, finding, or a judgment entered by a lower court.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  This is not a particularly accurate definition 
of the way the Mobile-Sierra doctrine has been thought to function as a standard of 
review since in such cases there is no statute or lower court under evaluation, only the 
parties’ contract.  See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2737 (2008).  In reality, the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine is actually a substantive standard used for evaluation of the facts 
in the first instance.  Under it, the Commission is not so much testing the parties’ 
decision-making process as it is the outcome of the process.  To help preserve the 
analogy it may be useful to think of it as representing two related notions: (1) the criteria, 
or test, created for evaluating whether or not the rate is just and reasonable and (2) the 
requirement that FERC “affirm” or “defer to” any rate that meets those criteria.  In this 
way, the rate is like a statute and the just-and-reasonable standard is like the 
Constitution or alternatively, the rate is like a jury verdict and the just and reasonable 
standard is the level of deference afforded that judgment. 
 102. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, § 344, at 506-07. 
 103. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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stage, then the rate cannot be assumed just and reasonable and the 
presumption disappears.104  To satisfy a standard of review in a factual 
context, one must show that the basic facts presented, when taken as a 
whole, could justify the conclusion sought.  Applying this to the just-
and-reasonable standard of review, one must show that the basic facts as 
a whole could reasonably support the conclusion that the rate is “unjust, 
unreasonable, discriminatory, or unduly preferential.”105 
One key operative difference creates the critical substantive disparity 
between these two devices: the type of factual evidence one must present 
to prevail.106 A presumption dramatically constricts the ambit of relevant 
evidence that can be introduced until the presumption is effectively 
rebutted.  Without the presumption, the standard of review would permit 
a much broader range of relevant evidence to be considered initially and 
in the final conclusion.  To rebut a “Mobile-Sierra presumption,” one 
must produce circumstantial evidence about the contracting parties’ 
incentives and negotiations—details that the presumption itself conceals.  
Such “intra-contractual” evidence is only likely to be available to the 
parties themselves, and obtaining it would pose significant challenges to 
outsiders.  In contrast, to satisfy the standard of review, a non-party 
could introduce a variety of “extra-contractual” evidence concerning the 
detrimental outcomes and effects of the contract rate on consumers. 
Introduction of the parties’ contract into evidence would trigger the 
operation of the presumption, which would recreate the issue of 
 104. The effect of successfully rebutting a presumption is actually a topic of 
substantial debate.  Known as the “Bursting Bubble” theory, it has its proponents and 
detractors.  See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, § 344(A).  While exploration 
of this debate is beyond the scope of this Article, it suffices to say that if a challenger 
brings forth the type of proof the Supreme Court indentified in Morgan Stanley, see 
supra note 73 and accompanying text, the presumption ceases to operate for purposes of 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. 
 105. This wording embodies the statutory allocation of the burden of proof on the 
Commission or complainant under section 205 of the FPA.  Federal Power Act, 16 
U.S.C. §824e(b) (2006). 
 106. Imagine a basic case of appellate review of a jury trial.  If some presumption 
present in the trial required the jury to return a certain verdict, the reviewing court would 
ask, “What was the conclusion the jury was required to draw?  Is the presumption 
rebuttable?  If so, what must be shown to rebut it?  Did the opposing party present such 
evidence?”  In contrast, if the court were reviewing a jury verdict rendered without the 
mandate of a presumption, under the applicable standard of review the reviewing court 
would ask, “What was the evidence the jury had to consider?  What is the verdict the 
jury drew? Was the verdict supported by the weight of the evidence considering the 
applicable burden of proof?”  The scope of potentially relevant evidence is very different 
in these two situations. 
 333 
 
ALLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  9:56 AM 
 
accessing relevant evidence already discussed.  If, by virtue of the 
contract being made, the conclusion automatically follows that the rate is 
just and reasonable, it basically forecloses any real possibility that a non-
party could mount a successful challenge.  The kind of circumstantial 
evidence needed to rebut the presumption would probably only be 
available to the parties themselves and could only be uncovered, if at all, 
through expensive and time-consuming discovery.  The problem is that 
Congress stated that one need only show that a rate is “unjust, 
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential,” but the Supreme 
Court now requires a threshold showing of something more.  Though it 
might be fair to apply this kind of heightened proof to parties who have 
affirmatively, or abstractly, indicated that they think the rate is just and 
reasonable under some sort of waiver theory, or to those otherwise 
responsible for creating the presumption, it is questionable whether it 
would be fair to abrogate the statutory rights of non-parties in the same 
fashion.  For either the party or the non-party to rebut the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption, it would have to show that the proper incentives did not 
exist at the time of the contract formation—i.e., the absence of arm’s-
length bargaining.  For this, it would have its arsenal of traditional 
contract defenses for unfair dealing—fraud, duress, etc.—as well as the 
option of proving that “market dysfunction” is caused by “illegal action 
by one of the parties.”107  However, as the dissent in Morgan Stanley  
points out, “By including contracts within the scope of [section] 
206(a) . . . Congress must have concluded that the contract defenses are 
insufficient to protect the public interest.”108  The dissent also noted that 
“the fact that the FPA tolerates contracts does not make it subservient to 
[them].”109  The Maine court also seems to have been aware of this 
alternate avenue of redress but obviously thought that it required a 
different solution.110 
Another argument in favor of the presumption understanding is based 
on the idea that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is not really a standard of 
review at all.  Representing this view are a small number of courts that 
have referenced the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in conjunction with a 
“burden of proof,” recognizing the substantive change to the level of 
 107. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2747 (2008); see supra note 73 and 
accompanying text. 
 108. Id. at 2758 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(“The purpose of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is to ‘preserve the benefits of the parties’ 
bargain as reflected in the contract, assuming that there was no reason to question what 
transpired at the contract formation stage.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Atlantic City. 
Elec. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 295 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002)), reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009). 
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evidence required to prevail;111 even though, in this context, those courts 
probably are more specifically referring to the burden of production.112  
Nonetheless, doctrinally, a standard of review and a burden of proof are 
not the same thing.113  Regardless of the persuasion/production distinction, 
the Morgan Stanley presumption language is still problematic under this 
alternate reading of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.  A presumption operates 
to shift the burden of production, and perhaps the burden of persuasion, 
on the party that it operates against.114 As Professor McCormick points 
out: 
Assignments of the burdens of proof prior to trial are not based on presumptions.  
Before trial no evidence has been introduced from which other facts are to be 
inferred.  The assignment [of the burden of proof] is made on the basis of a rule 
of substantive law providing that one party or the other ought to have one or 
both of the burdens with regard to an issue.115 
The Supreme Court agreed that the burden of proof is indeed defined 
by the substantive law governing the case—i.e., the statute.116  As 
previously noted, the statute in this context—the FPA—creates a burden 
of proof that obligates a challenger to show that the rate is “unjust, 
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.”  If the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine in fact creates a legal presumption that effectively 
modifies the burden of proof prior to trial, it would alter the rights of all 
challengers under the statute, effectively subjugating the entire clause of 
the statute to the filing mechanism at the sole discretion of private 
parties.117 
 111. Texaco Inc. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1091, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998); City of Frankfort 
v. FERC, 678 F.2d 699, 705 n.9 (7th. Cir. 1982); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 557 F.2d 227, 229 (10th. Cir. 1977). 
 112. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 330 (1986); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (burden of production). 
 113. See Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.9 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 114. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, § 343, at 500. 
 115. Id. § 342, at 499. 
 116. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 55 (2005). 
 117. At least two justices think this is exactly what is going on. In his dissent, 
Justice Stevens points out that even though the Court claims the presumption does not 
supplant, but is merely a “‘differing application” of the statutory just and reasonable 
standard, in reality “[t]here is no significant difference between requiring a heightened showing 
to overcome an otherwise conclusive presumption and imposing a heightened standard 
of review.”  Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2752 (2008) (Stevens J., dissenting). This, 
he believes, is the Court doing exactly what it said was “‘obviously indefensible’” in 
applying what is in effect a separate standard of review through the presumption.  Id. 
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Of course, it is not as if the statutory standard of review disappears 
entirely under a Mobile-Sierra presumption.  Rather, it is just re-
packaged as the public-interest standard the same way as always.  From 
this, one might argue that even though the Supreme Court has elucidated 
a new evidentiary route to remove the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, one can 
still challenge the rate under the public-interest standard using all matter 
of extra-contractual circumstantial evidence—that, in effect, any 
disparity created by the presumption is immaterial.  The obvious 
response to this is that even if the public-interest standard preserves the 
relevance of extra-contractual evidence, it still poses a much higher 
evidentiary burden than the naked just-and-reasonable standard and is 
just as, if not more, substantively different. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A.  The Post-Morgan Stanley Landscape 
Although a clear answer to the question originally presented may not 
be possible at this point, several observations from the foregoing may be 
helpful in at least discerning guiding principles that may help resolve the 
dispute. 
If the words of the Morgan Stanley Court are taken at face value and 
if the Mobile-Sierra doctrine does signify a far-reaching 
presumption about the contract rate, it seems clear that, in effect, the 
Supreme Court has redefined what initially qualifies as relevant 
evidence.  The conflict here is that Congress explicitly set forth the 
burden of proof and evidentiary requirements in the statute.  Even if the 
presumption was not strictly a legal one, operating only to shift the 
burden of proof during trial once the contract is introduced into 
evidence, one has to ask what relevance the contract would have to a 
party who had nothing to do with its making.  If the contract embodies 
the thoughts and agreements of the signatory parties, of what relevance 
is this to an outside party challenging the soundness of that judgment?  
To allow a biased contract to stand for evidence of good judgment when 
an outside party seeks to challenge the very judgment that produced the 
contract is a circular conundrum.  Unless used to impeach the argument 
of one of its principals to the contrary, the contract itself provides little 
probative value to test the allegation that it was poorly conceived in the 
first place. 
The Morgan Stanley Court did not address whether, by using the word 
“presumption,” it intended to go as far as altering the rights of non-
parties.  Although the repeated use of the construction may suggest an 
intent to drive that very point home, it is undercut by the Court’s core 
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rational for assuming the presumption applies—”‘the party charging the 
rate and the party charged [are] often sophisticated businesses, enjoying 
presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to 
negotiate a “just and reasonable” rate as between the two of them.’”118  
This suggests that the Court only had the contracting parties in mind 
when considering how the presumption would operate.119  To parse the 
phrase even further, the presumption may even be borne from the phrase 
“presumptively equal bargaining power,” which would obviously be 
nonsensical when applied to parties outside of the negotiations.  The idea 
that the Court would likewise endorse such a robust, far-reaching 
presumption that would not just simply affect the contract principals but 
substantively alter rights of non-participatory third parties outright is 
doubtful considering the Court’s position that such an interpretation 
would be “obviously indefensible.”120 
Perhaps the most important question is whether these inferences are 
enough to displace the direct and clear words of the D.C. Circuit that the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine is binding only “as between the contracting 
parties.”121  The Maine court even embraced the idea that Mobile-Sierra 
creates a presumption, a “strong presumption” that negotiations will 
produce a “settled rate [that] is just and reasonable, [that] the 
Commission may only set aside . . . for the most compelling reasons.”122  
Nonetheless, it still concluded that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine exists to 
“preserve the benefits of the parties’ bargain” and is limited to parties 
sharing a voluntary contract.123 
Absent explicit language in Morgan Stanley to rebut the clear 
assertion of Maine and the grant of the FPA, any inference made from 
 118. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2737, 2746 (2008) (quoting Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 476 (2002)) (alteration in original). 
 119. Consider also the Court’s statement that “[in] evaluating contractually sets 
rates [the ordinary mode] is to look to whether the rates seriously harm the public 
interest, not whether they are unfair to one of the parties that voluntarily assented to the 
contract,” id., which seems to imply the Court’s primary concern is with preventing 
“parties that voluntarily assented to the contract,” id., from escaping their liabilities for 
anything less than a very good reason.  But does that also mean those who did not 
voluntarily assent to the contract could challenge it as unfair or unreasonable? 
 120. Id. at 2740. 
 121. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 
reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
2050 (2009). 
 122. Id. at 477. 
 123. Id. 
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the “presumption” language will have to be strong enough not only to 
displace the D.C. Circuit’s clear and narrow analysis of the precise issue 
but also to rebut the statutory presumption that non-parties retain a right 
to use the unabridged just-and-reasonable standard in the interest of 
consumer protection.  By the analysis here, it doesn’t seem like such an 
outcome is likely. 
Assuming then that the Court meant to establish a more limited 
presumption, applicable primarily to the contract principals, then 
application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine will depend on two considerations: 
the source of the challenge and the independence of the challenger’s 
interests from those of the contract principals.  Essentially, how and if 
the rule will apply depends on who initiates the challenge.  As the Maine 
court observed, the doctrine exists to protect the interests of the parties 
as between themselves and perhaps against FERC as well, should it 
decide to intervene.124  If one of the principals or the Commission itself 
brings the challenge, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine most likely applies 
since the principals are entitled and expect to prospectively insulate their 
bargain from further interference from these sources, as established in 
Papago.125 But if the Commission merely acts as a forum for a challenge 
by an outside party, the doctrine is probably out of place because those 
interests never had a say in determining the level of protection that the 
agreement deserves.  This accords with the position of the Maine court 
that the doctrine is not designed to protect the interests of total outsider 
non-parties; rather, it is the statute that provides these protections.126  As 
the Northeast II court observed, the primary consideration in adapting 
the public-interest standard for atypical circumstances is determining 
who stands to lose out under the contract.127  If a contracting party loses 
out, it should be solely accountable for its own mistake, and the 
Commission should not intervene short of what is necessary to prevent 
extraordinary harm to third parties that might flow from the contract.  
But if the contract directly harms outside parties, the Commission must 
be given the right to intervene with broader discretion under a more 
 124. See supra Part I(C). 
 125. Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 126. Maine, 520 F.3d at 478.  Of course, this seems at odds with the Papago court’s 
statement that the backstop public interest standard, not the just and reasonable standard, 
exists to protect external parties.  Papago, 723 F.2d 950, 953 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  Whether 
or not this is a correct appraisal of the FPA’s intent, the Maine court might respond that, 
although such a position is certainly supportable when the challenge is brought by one of 
the contract principals, a different treatment is still justified when outside interests bring 
a challenge on their own accord. 
 127. See supra Part I(C). 
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relaxed standard of review to protect those unrepresented interests.128  
This again supports the notion that outsider interests deserve different 
treatment than insider ones when questioning the justness and 
reasonableness of a contract rate.129 
Together these understandings of the doctrine’s application appear to 
establish a trend. Under this trend, the Commission is afforded minimum 
discretion to alter the rate when one of the principals asks it to do so, 
intermediate discretion when it acts on its own accord to protect the 
generalized public interest, and maximum discretion when it acts 
pursuant to a third-party challenge and seeks to vindicate a particularized 
interest or grievance. In this last circumstance, perhaps FERC’s 
discretion extends so far as to review under the unabridged just-and-
reasonable standard.  Adapting this trend to presumption terminology, if 
the negotiations establish the presumption that the rate is just and 
reasonable, then that presumption runs most strongly against the contract 
principals, less strongly against FERC, and perhaps least strongly—if 
that, according to Maine—against non-parties. 
B.  What is the Best Policy? 
The patterns explained fit with the sometimes-conflicting goals 
emphasized by both the FPA and the Mobile-Sierra doctrine: respectively, 
 128. See Northeast II, 55 F.3d 686, 690-91 (1st Cir. 1995).  Under the rationale of 
Northeast I and Northeast II, this relaxation of the “practically insurmountable” public 
interest standard is justified because in these circumstances FERC has supposedly identified 
some genuine problem with the rate.  See id. at 691.  Thus, the concern that the contract 
parties are just attempting to use the Commission’s powers to bail them out of their own 
bad deal is not present. 
 129. Another interesting feature in this vein is that both the statute and the Sierra 
factors mention undue discrimination as one of the considerations in determining whether a 
rate is lawful.  See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2006); Fed. Power Comm’n 
v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353 (1956).  The position shared by the 
Commission and the Papago court regarding undue discrimination is that its focus 
changes in each context depending on who bears the brunt of the discrimination.  See 
Papago, 723 F.2d at 953 n.4.  Under the statutory mode of review, the Commission may 
consider if one of the parties to the contract is the recipient of undue discrimination and 
modify the contract accordingly.  16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).  However, under Mobile-Sierra 
review, the parties are deemed to have waived that protection and, provided that the 
externalities do not surpass a certain threshold, the analysis of undue discrimination 
comes to focus solely on those who are “not parties to the contract.”  Papago, 723 F.2d 
at 953 & n.4.  The interesting feature in this is that while the parties to the contract lose 
their statutory protections, non-parties do not and arguably become the chief concern as 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine takes over.  See id. 
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consumer protection and contract stability.  The contract concerns 
underlying the doctrine and the consumer protection concerns at the 
heart of the FPA will most likely be aligned in a functioning market with 
proper incentives but may be discordant in situations where those 
conditions are absent.  The pattern attempts to strike a balance between 
contract stability and consumer protection, depending on the parties and 
the interests in play. 
According to the Morgan Stanley Court, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
allows greater freedom of contract, which is important to supporting the 
role of contracts in the FPA’s statutory scheme.130  It held that “[t]he 
FPA recognizes that contract stability ultimately benefits consumers, 
even if short-term rates for a subset of the public might be high by 
historical standards—which is why it permits rates to be set by contract 
and not just by tariff.”131  To this end, it reasoned that “the FPA intended 
to reserve the Commission’s contract-abrogation power for those 
extraordinary circumstances where the public will be severely harmed.”132  
This assertion accords with all the cases previously discussed and with 
the Maine court’s observation that the doctrine recognizes “the superior 
efficiency of private bargaining[] and . . . subordinate[s] the statutory 
filing mechanism to the broad and familiar dictates of contract law.”133  
However, the Maine court doubted that applying the public-interest 
standard of review to non-parties would further “stability” and 
“certainty.”134 
These concerns are as old as the doctrine itself.135  Strong arguments 
can and have been made for assuring certainty and stability in order to 
encourage future bargaining between sophisticated parties.  But it is 
another question how these concerns are manifested in regard to non-
parties.  Assuming the non-party brings forth a valid concern—that it is 
not merely serving as a proxy for one of the contract principals—it must 
have some independent interest significant enough to motivate it to 
 130. Morgan Stanley , 128 S. Ct. 2737, 2739, 2747 (2008). 
 131. Id, at 2749. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Borough of Lansdale v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 494 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 
1974)), reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 
S. Ct. 2050 (2009). 
 134. See id. at 479.  The court held specifically that “[i]t makes no sense” to apply the 
public interest standard “to the eight parties that refused to agree to the terms of the 
settlement.”  Id.  While this would seem to limit the court’s assertion to circumstances where 
the non-parties previously objected to the terms, the broad language used by the court leading 
up the conclusion, which discusses non-parties in general terms, probably negates this 
inference.  See id. at 478-79. 
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undertake the costs of litigation that was not considered by the parties 
who created the agreement.  Such non-parties could consist of organized 
consumer groups or other similar state-sponsored consumer protection 
authorities, whose members would ultimately bear the costs of the 
contracting parties’ bad bargain.136  State public utilities commissions 
(PUCs) that are responsible for setting tariffs to provide a reasonable 
rate of return or new and struggling competitors protesting unjust rates 
could also fit this bill. 
One might say that such hypothetical parties are still protected by the 
ever-present public-interest standard, which by its very name implies 
that it is designed to safeguard these groups’ interests.  The problem, of 
course, is that the public-interest standard is still extremely onerous such 
that the concerns of the affected group, while valid in their own right, 
may not rise to the level that the standard demands.  Moreover, state 
ratemaking agencies are already significantly restrained under the “filed 
rate doctrine” (FRD) from exercising regulatory authority over FERC-
approved interstate rates.  The FRD requires that “interstate power rates 
filed with or fixed by FERC must be given binding effect by state 
utilities commissions determining intrastate rates” as a matter of federal 
supremacy under the Constitution.137 The FRD, handed down by the 
Supreme Court in Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Thornburg,138 
prohibits any second-guessing or modification for any reason by the 
state agency of the federally approved wholesale rate as to not upset 
Congress’s unified and plenary federal scheme of regulation.139  Thus, 
all state regulatory agencies are required to pass through any and all 
charges that FERC deems to be just and reasonable to the retail rates 
charged to end-use customers.140  While a full discussion of Nantahala 
and market-based rate authority is beyond the scope of this Article, it 
suffices to say that state utility agencies don’t have many tools at their 
disposal to protect their populace from exploitative or otherwise 
imprudent rates charged by interstate energy providers.  Taking away 
what is essentially their only way to effectively challenge a federal rate 
determination would leave state regulatory agencies charged with 
consumer protection with little choice but to make due regardless of 
 136. See, e.g., Nev. Power Co., 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,312, para. 30 n.63 (2008). 
 137. 23A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 56:431 (West 2009). 
 138. 476 U.S. 953 (1986). 
 139. Id. at 967. 
 140. Id. at 969-72. 
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rate’s unfairness applied to their jurisdiction. While the Court in 
Nantahala expressly discussed the topic of federal preemption, there is 
no similar consideration found in Morgan Stanley, which again calls into 
question whether the Mobile-Sierra doctrine can be inferred to extend to 
non-party challenges.141 
One might also argue that the interests of public groups are already 
adequately protected under the existing anti-trust laws.  However, anti-
trust laws existed at the time Congress passed the FPA, and by including 
explicit provisions governing proof for the causes of action created 
therein, perhaps it thought something more was required in this special 
context.142  Of course, to ensure that the exception would not swallow 
the rule, FERC would have to closely screen these hypothetical parties’ 
claims in order to uncover any conflicts, determine whether a claim is 
genuine, and discern under which standard of review it rightfully 
belongs.  Even if the contract principals are forced to defend their 
agreement against a non-party, they should have nothing to fear so long 
as the rate is just and reasonable, as it should be. 
With respect to the public groups’ concerns, it is doubtful whether a 
far-reaching Mobile-Sierra presumption would engender the right 
incentives vis-à-vis the FPA’s goal of consumer protection or provide 
appropriate deference to the Commission in carrying out its regulatory 
mission.  As recent experience bears out, the bad decisions made by 
blue-chip megaliths are often borne by the average joe.143  In some 
sense, the Commission exists as a forum, sometimes the only forum, that 
the public can use to enter into the fray and represent its interests in the 
costs of this indispensable resource.  Absent market choices, it may 
indeed be the only venue by which they can hope to influence their own 
bottom lines.  By insulating the contracting parties from all but the most 
 141. See generally Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and 
States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507 (2000) (discussing in greater detail national energy 
policy and federal preemption of state authority in the area). 
 142. The “filed-rate doctrine” creates other complications and obstacles in pursing 
this avenue of relief as well.  See generally Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: 
Judicial Enforcement for the Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591 (2003). 
 143. The reference here is to the recent financial crisis and resulting recession/ 
depression brought on by unregulated mortgage-backed securities and their 
related derivatives.  While during their heyday such instruments created windfall profits 
which translated into exorbitant Wall Street salaries and bonuses, in the aftermath of 
their decline it is the average citizen that is left to live with and clean up the rubble from 
the collapse.  As millions of citizens lose their jobs they are simultaneously being asked 
to foot the bill to save the very companies that invented the maelstrom in order to avoid 
further ruin for all.  It is these sorts of disproportionate benefits and burdens that justify 
close and scrutinizing regulation of companies wielding such huge market and economic 
influence, a trait that is not unique to financial conglomerates. 
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extraordinary challenges, it would allow them to effectively subvert the 
statute’s mechanism providing for rate challenges initiated by a 
complaint.  While the goals of “stability” and “certainty” are no doubt 
valuable, it is not to say that they will be jeopardized by placing 
additional incentives on parties to negotiate contracts, bearing in mind 
the interests of their captive customers under threat of just-and-
reasonable review upon complaint.  Arguably, even if FERC acting sua 
sponte is limited to the public-interest standard, the possibility that 
contracted rates would be subject to ratepayer attack under the just-and-
reasonable standard would encourage utilities to achieve rates that best 
respect the public interest in the just-and-reasonable sense of the word.  
Considering the monopolistic status of many players in the energy 
industry and the so-far failed efforts at deregulation, such a scepter, 
could be a useful check on consumer exploitation. 
The question of “best policy” may actually be beside the point insofar 
as the law is concerned, since technically it’s the Commission and not 
the judiciary that should be trusted with these types of decisions in both 
setting the policy and determining how to apply it.144  However, a 
discussion of administrative deference in this area is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  Whatever the entity charged with casting the final word on 
the matter is, it is important to realize that contract stability and consumer 
protection will occupy the same space sometimes and other times refuse 
to coalesce.  This supports the notion that non-parties should not be bound 
by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine because one can’t count on the contracting 
parties to act in the best interests of non-parties, absent incentives to do 
so.  In reality, investor-owned utility buyers cannot be counted on to 
look out for the interests of end-use customers.  Giving state PUCs and 
consumer groups the ability to counterbalance such inequities in 
representation at the contract stage with the threat of just-and-reasonable 
review, absent the restrictions of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, could 
provide the necessary incentive.  At the end of the day, the policy 
argument over whether and how the Mobile-Sierra doctrine should apply 
must center on which choice better serves the interests of the consuming 
public in the long run: contract stability or consumer protection. 
 144. See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (holding that it is 
within the discretion of the agency to determine how to proceed in creating a new policy 
or regulation especially in complex regulatory schemes); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that any agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of its own statute should be allowed to stand). 
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VI.  ADDENDUM 
The Supreme Court granted the Maine case certiorari on April 27, 
2009.145  The case was argued November 3, 2009, shortly before this 
Article went to print.146  The briefs of both the petitioners and respondents 
and the oral arguments focused on two issues: (1) whether the Maine 
court’s holding even applied to contract rates or to only those set by 
tariff and (2) whether allowing non-parties to challenge a contract rate 
under a more lenient standard of review than FERC or the contract 
principals was the best way to further the doctrine’s goal of contract 
certainty and stability.147  While this Article also touches on these issues, 
it raises another important consideration not addressed by the parties: 
namely, whether establishing a legal presumption based on the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine would effectively override the burden of proof specified 
by Congress in the FPA.  This precise question was not presented in the 
appeal, so resolution of this issue may have to wait for another day.  As  
such, this line of inquiry is likely to retain its vitality after the Court’s 
decision, within both this particular realm of jurisprudence and perhaps 
beyond.  
 
 145. NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009) 
(mem.), argued Transcript of Oral Argument, NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. 
Utilities Comm’n, 2009 WL 3612508 (Nov. 3, 2009). 
 146. Transcript of Oral Argument, NRG Power Mktg., 2009 WL 3612508 (Nov. 3, 
2009). 
 147. See generally id.; Brief for Petitioners, NRG Power Mktg., 2009 WL 1994752 
(July 7, 2009); Brief for Respondents, NRG Power Mktg., 2009 WL 2896320 (Sept. 4, 
2009). 
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